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“The Evidential Foundations of
Probabilistic Reasoning” by David A.
Schum “. . . contains a collection of
thoughts . . . ” (p. 1) on issues related to
evidence and to inference tasks based
on evidence. The study of such issues is
best summarized by an expression intro-
duced in chapter 1: “Science of Evidence.”
The Science of Evidence tries “. . . to treat
the study of evidence as having a life of
its own . . . ” (p. 8). This perspective of
examining evidence and inference with an
interdisciplinary, generalist approach, is
also reflected by the author David Schum
himself: he is a professor of law and infor-
mation technology and engineering at
George Mason University. The funda-
mental insights he shares in this book
are—unfortunately—all too often over-
looked and unknown in forensic and
judicial practice and research.
An important feature of evidential
inference is its involvement with uncer-
tainty, and consequently its probabilistic
nature. This view is held also by Schum.He
acknowledges that uncertainty is a preva-
lent feature of reasoning tasks based on
evidence, and that it attends situations of
daily life but also and most prominently,
legal applications: “. . . in any inference task
our evidence is always incomplete, rarely
conclusive, and often imprecise or vague;
it comes from sources having any gra-
dation of credibility. As a result, con-
clusions reached from evidence [. . . ] can
only be probabilistic in nature.” (p. xiii)
Unfortunately, forensic practice regularly
distrusts the notion of probability because
people focus on precise numbers (derived
from a generous data pool). However,
assigning numbers for probabilistic evi-
dence evaluation is neither a prerequisite
nor an end for analyses of evidential infer-
ence. Schum’s work is directly relevant
to this aspect by demonstrating that (1)
purely structural considerations on evi-
dence and (2) adopting probabilities as
numerically variable ingredients of infer-
ences, enable us to approach numerous
problems, and to explore evidential sub-
tleties or complexities. Let us first consider
(1) and then (2).
1. Every item of evidence fans out into
two primary dimensions: relevance and
credibility. A relevance relationship
between an event (for the purpose of
this review let us say, “DNA matches
with suspect’s DNA”) and a hypothesis
(“suspect is the assailant”) can involve a
multistage reasoning (chain of reason-
ing). A given linkage pattern between
elements of a chain of reasoning is
called “argument.” Elements regard-
ing the credibility of evidence (e.g.,
“how reliable is the expert reporting
the DNA typing results?”) are located
upstream in such a chain of reason-
ing. Depending on the type of evi-
dence and the desired level of detail, it
may also involve a multistage reason-
ing process and produce an argument.
Thus, a probabilistic assessment of evi-
dence requires an argument structured
in terms of relevance and credibility.
The argument structure becomes even
more complex when multiple items of
evidence are involved. In spite of this
fact, basic configurations of evidence
combination can be identified and ana-
lyzed probabilistically. Schum shows in
his studies that such basic configura-
tions of evidence combination result in
specific inference structures and well
defined inferential mechanisms.
2. Every item of evidence is characterized
by an inferential force. It expresses if
and to what extent evidence supports
a hypothesis. Its quantity depends on
the argument structure we choose for
the evidence and on the probabilis-
tic assessment we attach to the argu-
ment. The likelihood ratio is commonly
used in Bayesian analysis to mea-
sure the inferential force of evidence.
The study of likelihood ratios under
varying probabilities is an important
aspect of Schum’s work: “[m]y essential
research strategy was to perform sensi-
tivity analyses on the likelihood ratios
I identified.” (Schum, 1999, p. 576).
By doing so, Schum shows how cer-
tain argument structures give rise to
peculiar inferential phenomenons such
as in this non-exhaustive enumera-
tion: inferential drag, redundancy, and
synergism. Each additional reasoning
stage in a chain of reasoning gener-
ally weakens the inferential force of
an item of evidence: an inferential
drag is accumulated. The likelihood
ratio analysis on the inferential drag
shows how such an accumulation is
generated. Redundancy and synergism
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occur in specific configurations of evi-
dence combination. The presence of
the former implies that knowledge of
one item of evidence can diminish
or even nullify the inferential force
of another. Ignoring redundancies can
lead to overstatements of the joint
inferential force of the items of evi-
dence. Synergy relates to the opposite
situation: the knowledge on one item of
evidence increases the inferential force
of another. Ignoring synergies leads to
understatements of the joint inferential
force.
Now, how is such knowledge useful in
practice? First, it does not matter from
which domain the evidence comes from,
nor do we need to be familiar with its
domain-specific methods and techniques
to enhance our reasoning with these
insights. Second, by identifying generic
inference structures we know which infer-
ential mechanisms we are exposed to and
which we are not. Hence, we are less
likely to be subjected to flawed reason-
ing leading to over- and understatements
when assessing the inferential force of
evidence. Imagine, for example, a DNA
trace is analyzed by two laboratories. Now
we have two results, but is our evidence
also twice as strong? Third, knowledge
on basic inference structures creates gate-
ways to contextualized evidence interpre-
tation, and even more so when we deal
with masses of evidence [see for the analy-
sis of a judicial case (Kadane and Schum,
1996) and for a forensic case (Juchli
et al., 2012)]. This is a particularly strong
point since an item of evidence is typ-
ically found in conjunction with other
evidence.
The book discusses a vast array of
evidence related subjects from different
standpoints and across different disci-
plines. It demands time due to its broad
scope; careful reading, and mental flexi-
bility due to its interdisciplinary character.
Sometimes it might even ask for the reader
to be patient as some subjects are devel-
oped incrementally making a few passages
appear repetitive. In turn, many topics and
problems that have appeared opaque and
uneasy before may become clear and intel-
lectually palpable afterwards. For readers
who are interested in better understand-
ing the properties of evidence and how to
embrace evidence by systematic and logic
reasoning, this a book that deserves serious
consideration.
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